Rokan's Journal

Introduction

The geopolitics of South Asia is largely defined by the protracted rivalry between India and Pakistan alongside the strategic choices of other regional states. In recent years (2023–2024), longstanding India-Pakistan tensions – rooted in historical disputes like Kashmir – have persisted with new flashpoints, even as both nations maintain nuclear deterrents that constrain full-scale war

 At the same time, Bangladesh’s evolving foreign policy, exemplified by its 2023 Indo-Pacific Outlook, reflects a careful balancing act between great powers and neighbors

 These dynamics are shaping regional security, diplomatic engagement, and economic cooperation in complex ways. This report examines the latest developments in India-Pakistan relations, Bangladesh’s strategic posture, and their impact on South Asia’s geopolitical landscape, drawing on recent government policies, military maneuvers, economic initiatives, and expert perspectives. Comparative insights from other regions (like ASEAN’s integration and the Middle East’s diplomacy) will contextualize South Asia’s challenges. (All monetary values are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated.)

India-Pakistan Tensions: Recent Developments and Strategic Postures

Escalating Flashpoints and Security Incidents (2023–2024)

Despite an official ceasefire in place since 2003, India and Pakistan continued to experience intermittent border clashes and militant violence. Through 2023, deadly skirmishes were reported along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir

 In Indian-administered Kashmir, insurgent attacks targeted security forces and minorities, prompting a heavier Indian military crackdown

A notable incident occurred in March 2022 when an Indian supersonic missile was accidentally launched into Pakistani territory, causing no casualties but triggering diplomatic protests

Islamabad summoned India’s envoy, and New Delhi termed it a technical malfunction while expressing relief that no lives were lost

This rare accident underscored how quickly misunderstandings could ignite a crisis between the nuclear-armed neighbors. High-profile terrorist incidents also inflamed tensions. In February 2019, a suicide bombing in Pulwama killed 40 Indian paramilitary troops, leading India to carry out airstrikes inside Pakistan – the first such strikes in decades. Pakistan retaliated with its air force, bringing the rivals to the brink of war. Although direct conflict was averted, diplomatic ties deteriorated sharply. Pakistan downgraded relations and suspended bilateral trade after India revoked Jammu and Kashmir’s autonomous status in August 2019.

 By 2023–24, formal dialogue remained frozen, and both sides frequently traded accusations at international forums (India condemning Pakistan’s support for cross-border militancy, and Pakistan decrying India’s policies in Kashmir)

Each flare-up – from border firefights to militant attacks – feeds a cycle of mistrust, keeping South Asia on edge. Notably, even as political relations soured, a few confidence-building measures endured. For example, the countries quietly extended the Kartarpur Corridor agreement in late 2024, allowing Sikh pilgrims visa-free access to a holy shrine across the border until 2029

Such initiatives, while limited, indicate that channels of communication exist even amid hostility.

Military Postures and Doctrines of India and Pakistan

Both India and Pakistan have adjusted their military postures in light of ongoing tensions. India has been investing heavily in defense modernization, aiming for technological and numerical superiority. Its defense budget for 2024–25 was about $86 billion – over eight times Pakistan’s $10.2 billion – reflecting India’s larger economy and ambition to strengthen its military capabilities

Big-ticket acquisitions like Rafale fighter jets from France and S-400 air defense systems from Russia, as well as the commissioning of a new aircraft carrier, have enhanced India’s conventional edge

India has also emphasized indigenous defense production and joint exercises with partners (such as the Malabar naval drills with the US, Japan, and Australia) to project power in the wider Indo-Pacific region. At the doctrinal level, India maintains a declared “No First Use” (NFU) nuclear policy, pledging to use nuclear weapons only in retaliation to a nuclear attack

However, Indian strategists have developed concepts like “Cold Start” – a doctrine for swift, limited conventional strikes – aiming to punish Pakistan for terrorist provocations without triggering nuclear war. This more assertive strategy was evident in India’s 2016 surgical strikes and the 2019 Balakot airstrike on militant camps across the LoC

Pakistan, facing a conventionally stronger adversary, leans heavily on asymmetric tactics and nuclear deterrence for its security. The Pakistani military’s posture is encapsulated in its “Full Spectrum Deterrence” doctrine – a pledge to deter Indian aggression at all levels, including through the possible first use of nuclear weapons if Pakistan’s existence is at stake

Unlike India, Pakistan has not adopted an NFU policy and has developed lower-yield tactical nuclear weapons specifically to counter India’s conventional forces

This stance is meant to raise the costs of any Indian incursion, effectively using nuclear threats to offset India’s advantages. Pakistan’s army continues to deploy substantial forces along the eastern border, even as it contends with internal insurgencies (such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in its northwest). Militarily, Islamabad has deepened defense ties with Beijing to compensate for India’s might. Notably, in March 2022 Pakistan inducted the first batch of advanced Chinese J-10C fighter jets into its air force, with the then Prime Minister hailing their role in correcting the “security imbalance” vis-à-vis India

Joint Pakistan-China exercises and arms collaborations (from fighter jets to naval frigates and drones) have become routine, highlighting an evolving alliance. At the same time, Pakistan retains a stockpile of longer-range ballistic missiles (Shaheen and Ghaznavi series) capable of striking deep into India, which it tests periodically as a show of deterrent strength. Both countries now possess an estimated 160–170 nuclear warheads each

, and their nuclear doctrines – India’s restrained NFU versus Pakistan’s more elastic approach – cast a shadow over every military contingency. International observers note that these arsenals are intended “to stop wars, not start them,” acting as grim insurance against an all-out conflict

Diplomatic Standoff and Strategic Calculus

On the diplomatic front, India and Pakistan’s relations remain at a historic low as of 2024. High-level talks have not occurred in years, and ambassadors were downgraded or expelled in tit-for-tat moves

Routine dialogue on trade or travel is suspended – for instance, Pakistan has kept a unilateral halt on bilateral trade since 2019 in protest of India’s Kashmir policy

The stalemate has effectively paralyzed the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the regional bloc: summits have been indefinitely postponed due to India-Pakistan disagreements

Each nation’s strategic posture also reflects shifting great-power alignments. India has drawn closer to the United States and its allies, seeing a convergence in counterterrorism and in balancing China’s influence. Washington’s designation of India as a “Major Defense Partner” and inclusion in the Quad underscores this tilt. By contrast, U.S. ties with Pakistan have frayed; American officials have openly questioned Pakistan’s tolerance of extremist groups

Some Western analysts even argue for revoking Pakistan’s Major Non-NATO Ally status, given the Pakistani military’s history of covert support to militants and Islamabad’s growing strategic reliance on China

Pakistan, for its part, has sought to diversify its partnerships – maintaining links with the U.S. and Gulf Arab states for economic and security aid, but firmly anchoring its long-term strategic alliance with China (exemplified by the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor). Islamabad’s policymaking in recent years rhetorically emphasizes a shift from “geo-politics to geo-economics,” aiming to improve trade connectivity and economic credibility

In practice, however, unresolved political conflicts with India (especially over Kashmir and terrorism) have limited any real “peace dividend” from this pivot. Each country views the other’s strategic moves with deep suspicion – India perceives Pakistan’s China nexus and continued harboring of militants as direct threats, while Pakistan sees India’s military buildup and its alignment with the U.S./Quad as attempts to isolate and dominate Pakistan

This zero-sum mindset keeps South Asia locked in a precarious balance, where even a small incident can escalate rapidly unless cooler heads intervene.

 Table 1: Strategic Comparison – India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh

Country           Key Security Concerns ,     Strategic Doctrine & Posture   ,      Major Alliances/Partners        

India           Two-front threat (Pakistan in west, China in north); insurgency in Kashmir; border skirmishes. Growing partnership with U.S. (Indo-Pacific/Quad); traditional ties with Russia; regional cooperation with neighbors via BIMSTEC, etc.

Pakistan      Rivalry with India (Kashmir dispute); internal terrorism (e.g. TTP); instability in neighboring Afghanistan. Centrality of Kashmir in foreign policy; Full Spectrum Deterrence (tactical and strategic nuclear use if existential threat)

Bangladesh    Economic development and trade; Rohingya refugee crisis (instability in Myanmar); climate change threats.                                “Friendship to all, malice towards none” non-aligned policy balancing India’s influence with growing links to China; no nuclear weapons, focus on conventional defense modernization (Forces Goal 2030) and UN peacekeeping.  Close cultural and economic ties with India (border security and trade agreements); significant infrastructure and military cooperation with China active in regional forums (BIMSTEC, IORA) and pursuing broader Indo-Pacific engagement

Bangladesh’s Evolving Foreign Policy and Strategic Posture

Balancing Between Big Neighbors and Global Powers

Bangladesh, geographically nestled between India and the Bay of Bengal, has adopted a nuanced foreign policy that is increasingly pivotal in South Asia. Under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government (in power since 2009), Dhaka has championed a foreign policy doctrine of “balanced” relationships – maintaining cordial ties with India, China, the U.S., and other powers without aligning too closely with any. This approach echoes the founding dictum of Bangladesh’s diplomacy: “Friendship towards all and malice towards none.” In April 2023, Bangladesh unveiled its first Indo-Pacific Outlook (IPO), a 15-point document that articulates its vision for a “free, open, peaceful, secure, and inclusive” Indo-Pacific region

 The IPO underscores cooperation in maritime security, connectivity, sustainable development, and the “blue economy,” while deliberately avoiding antagonistic language toward any country

 Analysts note that Bangladesh’s IPO was timed ahead of Hasina’s high-profile visits to Japan, the US, and the UK, signaling an attempt to reassure Western partners of Dhaka’s commitment to an open Indo-Pacific order

At the same time, the document “evidently tried to balance its interests and relations with both Washington and Beijing,” reflecting Dhaka’s strategic tightrope walk between competing giants

In practice, Bangladesh supports Indo-Pacific initiatives like maritime security and supply chain resilience, but it avoids any military pacts that might alienate China. (Notably, when speculation arose about Bangladesh possibly joining the Quad, Chinese officials publicly warned against it in 2021 – and Dhaka promptly affirmed it would not join any security alliance, emphasizing independent decision-making.) Bangladesh’s relations with India remain crucial but have grown more complex as Dhaka diversifies its partnerships. India played a supportive role in Bangladesh’s 1971 independence and remains a key economic partner – India is Bangladesh’s second-largest trading partner and a provider of development assistance and transit access. In recent years, cooperation has deepened in areas like power sharing (cross-border electricity grids), connectivity (new bus/train routes and ports access), and counter-terrorism (with Bangladesh cracking down on insurgents hostile to India). However, Dhaka has also shown assertiveness on issues where interests diverge. For instance, Bangladesh has long sought a fair share of river waters (particularly the Teesta), but a treaty has been stalled by Indian domestic politics, breeding frustration in Dhaka

There is also sensitivity to India’s internal policies that affect Bangladesh: India’s National Register of Citizens (NRC) and Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) in 2019 sparked concern in Bangladesh about a potential influx of migrants, contributing to a perception that India’s hegemonic actions sometimes threaten Bangladeshi interests

Economically, Bangladesh runs a large trade deficit with India (exceeding $10 billion by 2024) and has criticized what it sees as “unequal” terms in some deals

A notable example was Bangladesh’s scrutiny of a 2022 agreement to import electricity from India’s Adani Group; the Bangladeshi side sought to renegotiate the terms over pricing concerns

Such moves signal Dhaka’s desire for more equitable relations and strategic autonomy, even with its friendliest neighbor. Meanwhile, ties with China have expanded significantly, reflecting Bangladesh’s bid to hedge its bets. China is now Bangladesh’s biggest trading partner and a major source of infrastructure financing. Dhaka joined Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2016 and has since seen a surge of Chinese-funded projects: ports, bridges, power plants, and industrial zones. For example, China helped construct the Padma Bridge (Bangladesh’s largest bridge) and the Karnaphuli Tunnel (South Asia’s first under-river tunnel), and is involved in modernizing the Mongla port and developing special economic zones

In the defense realm, Bangladesh has procured Chinese military hardware including naval frigates, tanks, and fighter jets, and even two submarines in 2016 – a first for its navy, which raised eyebrows in New Delhi. Under Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh has generally balanced these investments by also engaging India and others; for instance, Bangladesh cancelled a Chinese proposal for a deep-sea port at Sonadia, only to later collaborate with Japan on a port at Matarbari, seen as a more acceptable alternative. Still, Chinese influence in Bangladesh has grown enough that some describe Dhaka’s strategy as “bandwagoning on Chinese economic power while keeping security ties with India”. In 2023, Bangladesh welcomed $2.1 billion in new Chinese investments and grants, and Beijing extended zero-tariff treatment to 98% of Bangladeshi exports– a boon as Bangladesh prepares to graduate from Least Developed Country status by 2026. Notably, Bangladesh also looks to China for diplomatic leverage on issues like the Rohingya refugee crisis; China has at times mediated between Bangladesh and Myanmar for repatriation of the over 1 million Rohingya refugees sheltering in Cox’s Bazar

This humanitarian issue is a foreign-policy priority for Dhaka, and China’s involvement is cautiously welcomed as Bangladesh seeks a durable solution. With Pakistan, Bangladesh’s relations are burdened by the legacy of the 1971 Liberation War (when Bangladesh seceded from then-West Pakistan). For decades, ties remained cold; however, there have been modest improvements in recent years. High-level contacts resumed in 2021–2022, with Pakistan’s leaders sending goodwill messages on Bangladesh’s 50th Independence anniversary. There were discussions about boosting trade and granting visas more easily. Still, progress is limited – Dhaka insists that Islamabad formally apologize for 1971 atrocities (a step Pakistan has avoided), and under Hasina’s government (which represents the pro-independence ethos), there is little political incentive to get too close to Pakistan. Bangladesh also aligns with India on many regional issues, meaning it has cautiously supported India’s stance on terrorism. As of 2023, Bangladesh and Pakistan maintain diplomatic ties but are not significant strategic partners. Some analysts speculate that if Bangladesh’s domestic politics shift (for example, if a new government less aligned with India comes to power), Dhaka-Islamabad ties could warm as a counterbalance to India

Indeed, an “interim government” scenario in late 2024 (imagined by observers) suggested Bangladesh might explore closer ties with Pakistan and China while relations with India cool

For now, though, Bangladesh’s foreign policy trajectory is primarily about maximizing economic development and security through multi-directional engagement – not about joining one bloc against another.

Strategic Autonomy and Defense Initiatives

Bangladesh’s pursuit of strategic autonomy is also evident in its defense and security policies. Although Bangladesh spends far less on defense than India or Pakistan (its 2024–25 defense budget is about $3.8–4 billion, it has a long-term modernization plan called Forces Goal 2030. This roadmap aims to upgrade the army, navy, and air force with new equipment and training. In recent years, Bangladesh has acquired advanced fighter jets (from China and Russia), modern patrol vessels, and missile systems to enhance its coastal defense in the Bay of Bengal. The Bangladesh Navy in particular has been given priority, as the country stakes greater economic claims in its maritime Exclusive Economic Zone (rich in fisheries and energy). The addition of Chinese-made submarines and Italian maritime patrol aircraft has extended Bangladesh’s naval reach, which is significant in a region increasingly contested by larger powers’ navies. Despite these steps, Bangladesh maintains a defensive military posture with no offensive intents; its forces often focus on UN peacekeeping missions abroad (Bangladesh is consistently a top troop contributor to UN peacekeeping) which also boosts its international standing. Bangladesh has also engaged in joint military exercises with both India and China, careful to signal balance. For instance, it conducts the annual “Sampriti” army exercise with India to improve interoperability, and has held counter-terrorism drills with Chinese and U.S. forces at different times. Bangladesh’s internal stability concerns (like combating extremism and managing the Rohingya influx) mean its foreign policy priorities often center on non-traditional security issues – from terrorism to climate change – where it seeks cooperative solutions. In the Indo-Pacific Outlook, Dhaka highlighted tackling transnational crime, maritime piracy, and humanitarian assistance as key areas for regional collaboration

This indicates Bangladesh’s desire to be seen as a responsible regional actor contributing to collective security, even as great-power rivalry intensifies around it. Indeed, Bangladesh has joined new regional initiatives such as the BIMSTEC Grid Interconnection to share electricity and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) to promote maritime safety. Notably, while deepening ties with China, Bangladesh has so far kept a lid on any security cooperation that would alarm India – for example, it reportedly deferred a proposed Chinese-built Teesta River management project out of deference to India’s sensitivities over water projects

Such careful calibration underscores how Bangladesh’s foreign policy evolution is shaping the regional order: Dhaka is asserting its interests more independently, yet striving not to tip the balance of power in South Asia too far in any direction. This evolving posture of a “middle power” in South Asia adds a new layer to the India-Pakistan dominated geopolitical landscape, potentially acting as a stabilizing bridge or, if mishandled, becoming another source of friction (for instance, if India-China competition for influence in Bangladesh intensifies). So far, Bangladesh has largely succeeded in reaping economic gains from all sides while avoiding entanglement in the India-Pakistan rivalry – a diplomatic tightrope that will be tested as great-power competition in the Indo-Pacific heats up.

Regional Cooperation and Economic Rivalries

Stalled Regional Integration: SAARC’s Paralysis

South Asia’s regional cooperation has long been impeded by political tensions, chiefly the India-Pakistan rivalry. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which comprises India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and (technically) Afghanistan, has not held a leaders’ summit since 2014. Plans for a 2016 summit in Islamabad collapsed when India and several others pulled out after a terrorist attack in India, which New Delhi blamed on Pakistan. Since then, SAARC has been effectively dormant. The “deep-seated political and territorial conflict” between India and Pakistan is widely cited as the biggest roadblock to SAARC’s functionality. India accuses Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism, while Pakistan protests India’s “heavy-handed” policies in Kashmir – and neither is willing to meet while such core disputes fester. This mistrust has led to the suspension of SAARC summits and a freeze in initiatives like the SAARC free-trade area. Unlike more successful regional blocs (ASEAN in Southeast Asia or the EU), SAARC lacks strong institutional mechanisms to enforce cooperation or mediate conflicts. Smaller member states often feel that SAARC’s agenda is held hostage to the India-Pakistan feud. They also voice concerns about India’s overwhelming size and economy dominating any integration effort. The result is that South Asia remains one of the least integrated regions in the world – intra-regional trade is under 5% of total trade (far below ASEAN or EU levels). Interestingly, recent diplomatic shifts have raised the possibility of a SAARC revival from unlikely quarters. Pakistan and Bangladesh – historically not close – have shown interest in reinvigorating SAARC as a counterweight to other alliances. In late 2024, during a sideline meeting at the UN, Pakistan’s Prime Minister and the chief adviser of Bangladesh’s interim government discussed the need to “revive SAARC” and enhance intra-regional trade. Islamabad sees strategic advantage in SAARC as it would provide a platform where Pakistan can engage India and other neighbors collectively; moreover, Pakistan views a revived SAARC as a way to counterbalance India’s increasing ties with Western powers and groupings like the Quad. For Bangladesh, a functional SAARC could open more trade routes and reduce over-reliance on any single neighbor. However, any serious revival would require India and Pakistan to set aside or compartmentalize their contentions, at least for economic cooperation – a prospect that remains uncertain. As experts note, “for SAARC to be revived, both nations would need to put these issues on the backburner”, something neither New Delhi nor Islamabad has been willing to do so far. In the interim, South Asian countries have sought alternative forums to cooperate, sidestepping the Indo-Pak impasse.

Emergence of Alternative Frameworks: BIMSTEC and Others

With SAARC sidelined, India and its neighbors have pivoted to other regional frameworks. A prominent example is the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). BIMSTEC links five South Asian countries (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka) with two Southeast Asian countries (Myanmar, Thailand), intentionally excluding Pakistan. In the past few years, BIMSTEC has gained new momentum and institutional structure – it held its 5th summit in 2022 where members signed a formal charter and outlined a vision for 2030. Seen as “a bridge between South and Southeast Asia,” BIMSTEC focuses on connectivity projects, trade, energy sharing, and security cooperation in the Bay of Bengal region. India has invested considerable diplomatic capital in BIMSTEC as part of its “Neighbourhood First” and “Act East” policies, effectively using it to engage neighbors without Pakistan’s presence. For Bangladesh, BIMSTEC is equally attractive – Dhaka was a founding member and envisions the forum as complementary to its own bridging role between South Asia and ASEAN. While BIMSTEC’s achievements are modest so far, it has made progress on a coastal shipping agreement, a motor vehicles pact for cross-border transport, and a grid interconnection to trade electricity among members. In the security realm, BIMSTEC countries have begun cooperating on counter-terrorism and disaster management. The growing importance of BIMSTEC illustrates a broader trend: subregional cooperation is filling the void left by SAARC’s failure. Initiatives like the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) grouping for transport integration and the India-Maldives-Sri Lanka trilateral cooperation on maritime security are other examples. These frameworks tend to be more flexible and project-driven, allowing willing nations to move ahead even if one or two neighbors opt out. However, their scope is narrower than SAARC’s original vision, and they cannot entirely substitute for a region-wide platform. Another regional integration driver is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Through BRI, China has become a significant economic player in South Asia, funding infrastructure that connects the region more closely with China – and, indirectly, with each other. The flagship China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has brought over $25 billion in Chinese investment to Pakistan for highways, ports, and power plants. CPEC’s corridor of roads and pipelines from western China to Pakistan’s Gwadar port could eventually link into networks reaching other South Asian states (if political conditions allow). Similarly, Chinese-built projects in Bangladesh (ports, bridges, rail upgrades) and in Sri Lanka (the Hambantota port and Colombo Port City) are transforming the physical infrastructure landscape. While these are bilateral Chinese partnerships, they have regional geopolitical implications. For instance, China’s foothold at Pakistan’s Gwadar port and Sri Lanka’s Hambantota (leased to China for 99 years after Sri Lanka’s debt repayment issues) gives Beijing strategic positions in the northern Indian Ocean – a fact that India views with concern. India has pointedly stayed out of BRI, even boycotting BRI forums, largely because CPEC passes through Pakistan-administered Kashmir which India claims as its territory (thus India objects to CPEC on sovereignty grounds). Moreover, India is wary of Chinese-funded debt burdens on smaller neighbors that could translate into political leverage (the so-called “debt-trap” diplomacy). In response, India has promoted its own connectivity initiatives: one example is the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) through Iran to Central Asia, and more recently, India joined with the U.S., UAE, and others to propose an India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) in 2023 as a new trade route linking South Asia with the Middle East and Europe (bypassing traditional routes controlled by rivals). Such projects indicate that a geo-economic competition is unfolding – on one side, China’s BRI projects tying Pakistan and others closer to Beijing’s orbit; on the other, India (with Western partners) seeking alternative corridors that reinforce its own strategic links. This competition is shaping choices for countries like Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, which try to benefit from both sides while avoiding overdependence.

Trade and Economic Corridors

On the trade front, South Asia has seen a mix of bilateral and multilateral efforts, but overall integration remains low. India has inked free trade or preferential trade agreements with several neighbors (for example, an FTA with Sri Lanka, duty-free access for Nepali and Bhutanese goods, and special trade concessions to Bangladesh under regional schemes). Bangladesh, as it approaches middle-income status, is actively negotiating new trade agreements to lock in market access after it exits LDC preferential regimes – talks are ongoing for possible FTAs or comprehensive economic partnership agreements (CEPAs) with countries like India, Sri Lanka, and regional blocs. Pakistan and India, unfortunately, have a largely untapped trade potential due to political barriers. Until 2019, Pakistan maintained a restrictive trade regime with India (allowing only a list of items), and after the Kashmir crisis that year, Pakistan suspended even that limited trade. As a result, informal trade (smuggling via third countries like UAE) often takes the place of direct commerce between the two largest economies of South Asia. This is a lose-lose situation, as studies have shown India-Pakistan annual trade could be in the tens of billions of dollars if normalized, compared to just a couple of billion when relations were semi-open. There have been minor positive steps – in 2022, under a ceasefire détente, Pakistan briefly considered importing Indian wheat during a food crisis, and the two sides renewed agreements like the Kartarpur Corridor for religious tourism as noted earlier. But meaningful economic engagement awaits a thaw in political relations. Within the region, new economic corridors are being developed that could change strategic equations. The Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Corridor was once proposed under BRI to link those countries by road, but India’s reluctance has stalled it. Instead, India and Bangladesh have advanced bilateral connectivity: multiple land ports and integrated check-posts have been opened, and India now uses Bangladesh’s Chattogram (Chittagong) port to transit goods to India’s northeast, reflecting deepening economic interdependence. Bangladesh and Nepal recently agreed (with India’s assent) on transit that allows Nepal – a landlocked nation – to use Bangladeshi ports for its trade. Additionally, energy cooperation is on the rise: Bangladesh imports several hundred megawatts of electricity from India, and plans are afoot for joint hydropower projects involving Nepal, Bhutan, and India with Bangladesh as a buyer – a true win-win scenario if realized. These networks not only have economic significance but also strategic: they bind countries together in peacetime benefits, ideally reducing incentives for conflict. However, the India-Pakistan estrangement means Pakistan is notably absent from these regional integration projects, instead focusing westward (e.g., integrating with China’s economy and looking to Central Asia via Afghanistan for new markets). Islamabad’s push for “geo-economics” envisions Pakistan as a transit hub between South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Realization of this vision depends on stability in Afghanistan and some level of détente with India to open transit routes eastward. There have been calls, including from Pakistani business groups, to at least resume limited trade with India to help Pakistan’s struggling economy (especially as Pakistan faced an economic crisis in 2022–23). Likewise, farmers and industries in Indian Punjab have lobbied for reopening overland trade to Pakistan and beyond, which could be mutually beneficial. So far, political will is lacking. In summary, South Asia’s economic landscape is being shaped by a paradox: on one hand, new corridors and partnerships are forming (many involving Bangladesh as a pivotal junction) that promise greater connectivity and growth; on the other hand, the full potential of regional integration is constrained by the deep freeze in India-Pakistan relations. The region thus experiences a kind of “two-speed” integration – with India and willing neighbors accelerating cooperation, while India and Pakistan remain largely cut off from each other. How Bangladesh and other smaller states maneuver will be crucial. If Bangladesh can maintain productive ties with both India and China, it might help channel some Chinese investment into broader regional projects that include India (for example, cross-border railways or ports that serve all of South Asia). Conversely, if rivalry hardens into rival blocs, Bangladesh and its neighbors might be forced to choose sides, which could further fragment the region’s economic space.

Perspectives from Academia, Government, and Media

The current trajectory of South Asian geopolitics has elicited a range of analyses from scholars, policymakers, and journalists. A common theme is concern over the persistent India-Pakistan hostility and its ripple effects. The International Crisis Group and other think tanks warn that without dialogue, even a small provocation could spiral into a larger conflict given the lack of communication channels. They note that domestic politics often fuel the rivalry – for instance, nationalist sentiment in India and Pakistan makes compromise over Kashmir difficult, as leaders fear public backlash. Academic experts on nuclear strategy point out that the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons by Pakistan and India’s evolving military doctrines have made the situation “less stable” than in the early years of their deterrence relationship. Each side’s military planners now have to consider a wider spectrum of conflict, raising questions about command-and-control and escalation control in crises. Some Indian strategists argue India should keep a degree of ambiguity in its NFU pledge to strengthen deterrence (indeed, India’s defense minister in 2019 hinted that India’s NFU policy “depends on circumstances,” stirring debate). Pakistani officials, on the other hand, emphasize that their nuclear arsenal is the only thing preventing an all-out Indian attack – a mindset rooted in the harsh reality that Pakistan lost conventional wars in 1965 and 1971. As an AP analysis succinctly put it, Pakistan “can ill afford to initiate nuclear war with India because of its neighbor’s superior firepower,” so it uses nuclear threats to deter India from even contemplating invasion. This dynamic has led to what many describe as a stalemate: war is unlikely due to mutual deterrence, but peace is elusive due to irreconcilable positions, leaving a chronic low-grade conflict. Indian and Pakistani media often mirror this divide, each blaming the other for the impasse. Indian outlets highlight Pakistan’s failure to crack down on groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed that have targeted India, while Pakistani outlets focus on Indian “aggression” in Kashmir and human rights issues there. Government statements too follow this script: India’s leaders insist “terror and talks cannot go together,” demanding Pakistan act against jihadist militants as a precondition for dialogue; Pakistan’s leaders insist on discussing Kashmir’s status and condemning what they term Indian “oppression” before normal ties can resume. These hardened public stances leave little space for diplomatic maneuver, absent external facilitation. Regarding Bangladesh’s foreign policy, commentary tends to applaud Dhaka’s economic gains but also caution about challenges ahead. Bangladeshi and international analysts note that Hasina’s government successfully leveraged great-power relationships to benefit Bangladesh – receiving investments from China while also enjoying trade privileges from the West – a testament to skilful diplomacy. The launch of the Indo-Pacific Outlook in 2023 was seen by many as Bangladesh “coming of age” on the global stage, articulating its own vision rather than being a passive player. However, some experts argue the IPO was “a missed opportunity” in that it avoided clear positions and “stops short of providing any clear directions” for implementation. This ambiguity is likely intentional, to maintain flexibility. Neighbors have their perspectives too: Indian strategic circles are watchful of Bangladesh’s growing ties with China. Indian media has on occasion expressed disquiet at projects like a Chinese-built surveillance system for Dhaka or the presence of Chinese engineers near sensitive sites, fearing a creeping security foothold. Bangladeshi commentators respond that the country’s engagement with China is purely for development and “strategic neutrality”, not aimed against India. Indeed, Bangladesh often positions itself as a potential mediator or facilitator – for example, suggesting that improved India-Bangladesh connectivity could eventually extend to benefit Pakistan or Nepal. Some Bangladeshi op-eds have suggested reviving the spirit of “BIMSTEC and BCIM” to foster an inclusive economic zone that doesn’t get bogged down in politics. Government perspectives in Bangladesh remain diplomatically phrased: they reiterate gratitude for India’s past support and emphasis on historic bonds, while also declaring Bangladesh’s sovereign right to engage any partner (a subtle message to both India and China that Bangladesh will not be exclusively in one camp). The Bangladesh government has also become more vocal about its red lines – for instance, it conveyed to major powers that it will not tolerate any interference in its domestic politics (as seen when Bangladesh cautioned foreign envoys, amid some Western criticism of its elections). This assertiveness at home complements its balanced approach abroad. From a broader regional perspective, think-tank scholars often lament that South Asia hasn’t capitalized on its potential due to political discord. Comparisons are drawn with Southeast Asia (ASEAN) to highlight what South Asia could achieve. A Nepalese publication pointed out that “ASEAN’s secretariat plays a pivotal role in driving regional cooperation, whereas SAARC’s secretariat is often ineffective,” largely because SAARC lacks unity from the top. Another analysis in Eurasia Review noted that unlike ASEAN, which set aside bilateral disputes to pursue collective growth, SAARC has no mechanism to resolve conflicts or enforce agreements, so “disagreements, particularly between India and Pakistan, have rendered the organization dormant”. Economists stress that South Asia’s huge population (a quarter of the world) and growing economies could reap immense mutual benefits if barriers fell – something countries like Bangladesh and Nepal keenly understand as they seek more access to the Indian and Pakistani markets. Internationally, there is also recognition that instability between India and Pakistan carries global risks, given both nations’ nuclear arsenals and their role in issues like counter-terrorism. Major powers have often tried quiet diplomacy at moments of crisis: the U.S. and China jointly prevailed upon India and Pakistan to stand down during the 2019 crisis, and more recently in 2021, it was reported that backchannel talks (possibly facilitated by the UAE) helped India and Pakistan reaffirm a ceasefire along the LoC. Western media outlets like The Economist and BBC periodically run features titled “Why are India and Pakistan fighting?” or “What will it take for India and Pakistan to make peace?”, reflecting both curiosity and concern. The consensus in such analyses is that status quo is a costly drag – it keeps defense expenditures high (to the detriment of social spending) and South Asia remains one of the least economically integrated regions. For example, India’s military spending is fifth-highest globally and growing, while Pakistan’s heavy defense burden strains its weak economy. As one Indian general-turned-analyst observed, “Every rupee spent on fighter jets is a rupee not spent on schools or hospitals – the true cost of our conflict”. This view is gaining traction among civil society in both countries, even if political leaders remain locked in enmity. In Bangladesh’s case, media and academic voices are generally supportive of its non-aligned stance but urge vigilance. They argue Bangladesh must continuously ensure it is not overly indebted or influenced by any one great power – a delicate task as Chinese loans accumulate and as India expects deference on regional matters. Bangladesh’s success in maintaining independence in foreign policy will, in many ways, set a template for other small states in South Asia (like Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives) who are attempting similar balancing acts. A study in 2023 described Bangladesh as “navigating its foreign policy with increasing autonomy, balancing relations with regional powers like India, China, and Pakistan to maximize its national interest”. This balancing strategy is seen as necessary in today’s multipolar environment. However, Bangladeshi scholars also caution that as U.S.-China rivalry grows, pressure will mount on countries like Bangladesh to pick a side on certain issues (for instance, joining U.S.-led Indo-Pacific military exercises or signing defense agreements). Already, Bangladesh’s armed forces have benefited from U.S. training programs and UN missions, while also using Chinese hardware – a duality that might become harder to sustain if global blocs harden. Thus far, Dhaka’s mantra of “friendship to all” has served it well, and experts advise continuing that path, perhaps with greater engagement in multilateral forums to amplify Bangladesh’s voice on global issues (peacekeeping, climate change, etc.).

Comparative Regional Insights: ASEAN and the Middle East

South Asia’s geopolitical challenges can be better understood by comparing them with patterns in other regions, such as Southeast Asia (ASEAN) and the Middle East. These regions have experienced their own historic rivalries yet have taken steps – with varying success – to manage them. Southeast Asia (ASEAN): ASEAN’s experience is often held up as a contrast to SAARC. Formed in 1967, ASEAN began with a group of Southeast Asian nations that had their share of disputes (e.g. Indonesia’s “Konfrontasi” with Malaysia, or territorial tiffs between neighbors). However, ASEAN members agreed on principles of non-interference and consensus, choosing to sideline bilateral conflicts in the interest of regional cooperation. This approach allowed ASEAN to focus on economic integration and presenting a united front in diplomacy. Over decades, ASEAN has built robust institutions and a free trade area, and even brought former adversaries (like Vietnam and Cambodia) into its fold. The result is a region that trades extensively within itself and has largely avoided war between member states since ASEAN’s inception. In comparison, South Asia has struggled to emulate this model. The feud between India and Pakistan has repeatedly derailed joint initiatives, and SAARC’s charter itself prohibits discussion of bilateral disputes, which has paradoxically meant no discussion at all when those disputes dominate relations. An observer quipped that “ASEAN talks about economics and avoids politics, whereas SAARC gets trapped by politics and can’t talk about economics.” The implication is that South Asia might learn from ASEAN by insulating economic and functional cooperation from political disputes. For instance, ASEAN’s success in fostering regional trade and connectivity stands in stark relief to SAARC’s failure – ASEAN’s intra-regional trade is around 25% of its total trade, whereas SAARC’s is abysmally low, partly due to India-Pakistan trade barriers. If India and Pakistan could adopt even a fraction of ASEAN’s cooperative spirit (for example, jointly working on disaster relief, or public health, regardless of other tensions), it could build trust gradually. So far, attempts at such functional cooperation (like the SAARC COVID-19 fund proposed by India in 2020) saw limited participation from Pakistan, again reflecting mistrust. The institutional weakness of SAARC compared to ASEAN is another factor – ASEAN’s secretariat proactively facilitates diplomacy, whereas SAARC’s is minimal without political will from the top. This comparative insight underscores that regional frameworks are only as strong as their member states’ commitment. In South Asia, perhaps a recalibration where smaller states like Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka collectively push the big two (India and Pakistan) towards an “ASEAN-style” pragmatism could be key. There are signs of this: these smaller countries often urge both giants to not let bilateral issues impede regional deals (as seen in calls to revive SAARC or make SAFTA – the South Asian Free Trade Area – fully functional). Still, the road to an ASEAN-like community in South Asia is long, and it likely hinges on progress in India-Pakistan relations, which ASEAN did not have an equivalent of (no two ASEAN members had as deep-rooted a conflict as India-Pakistan’s). The Middle East: The Middle East has been another theater of enduring rivalries – notably the Saudi Arabia-Iran rivalry and the Arab-Israeli conflict – offering parallels and contrasts. One instructive development is the recent Saudi-Iran détente: in 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to restore diplomatic ties in a deal brokered by China, after years of proxy conflicts and hostility. This rapprochement shocked many observers, as it showed that external mediation and shifting geopolitical calculations can lead to unexpected peace overtures. For South Asia, where China, the U.S., or other powers have occasionally offered to mediate between India and Pakistan, the Middle Eastern example suggests that if both parties see benefit, a third-party facilitator could help bridge gaps. China’s role in West Asia indicates Beijing’s growing diplomatic clout – and indeed, China has hinted at wanting to play peacemaker in South Asia too (though India staunchly rejects third-party mediation on Kashmir). The Saudi-Iran deal was driven by fatigue of conflict and mutual need (economic focus, security assurances). Similarly, some argue that India and Pakistan might one day reach a “hurting stalemate” where the costs of hostility outweigh politics, potentially opening doors to mediation or at least more active dialogue – perhaps under the auspices of a friendly nation or organization (some have floated the idea of Gulf countries, given their ties to both, or Russia/China stepping in, but India’s consent remains the hurdle). Another Middle Eastern parallel is the Abraham Accords (normalization between Israel and some Arab states in 2020). That showed how common interests (in that case, against Iran or for economic tech ties) trumped decades of rhetoric. In South Asia, a comparable scenario would be India and Pakistan finding a common strategic interest – for example, both face threats from extremist terror groups (Pakistan from TTP/ISIS-K, India from cross-border jihadis). A joint effort on counter-terrorism, perhaps quietly coordinated, could serve both. In fact, there have been hints: after the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan (2021), India and Pakistan both fear Afghan soil being used by terrorists, and both engaged the Taliban regime to seek stability. There’s speculation that down the line, pragmatic security cooperation might happen behind the scenes. Moreover, the Middle East’s sectarian divide (Sunni vs Shia power competition) has some resemblance to India-Pakistan’s ideological-nationalist divide (secular India vs Islamic Republic of Pakistan narrative). Yet, as seen with Saudi-Iran, pragmatic needs (like economic visions – Saudi’s Vision 2030, Iran’s need to end isolation) can recalibrate those divides. In South Asia, economic imperatives might similarly push change: Pakistan’s economic crisis is so severe that it might eventually compel its leadership to seek peace for trade and investment; India’s global economic ambitions could be boosted by a stable neighborhood allowing seamless connectivity to Central Asia and beyond. One can draw a line to how Egypt made peace with Israel in 1979 partly to recover economically and regain Sinai – a bold move after four wars. If Pakistan’s policymakers come to view normalization with India as essential to rescue Pakistan’s economy (for instance, accessing India’s vast market or benefiting from Indian investment, as even some Pakistani business leaders have advocated), we could see movement. Indian commentators sometimes invoke how “Nixon went to China” – an unexpected thaw is not impossible if strategic circumstances align. Finally, looking at Northeast Asia, another nuclear flashpoint: the Korean Peninsula sees periodic tension but also summits and talks, and the U.S. played a mediating role there. By contrast, India-Pakistan haven’t had a meaningful summit in years, and the U.S. mediation is officially off the table since India opposes it. However, informal diplomacy – such as the UAE-brokered backchannel that led to the 2021 LoC ceasefire reaffirmation – shows that quiet facilitation can work even if public mediation cannot. This is akin to how behind-the-scenes contacts prepared the ground for Middle East deals. The lesson for South Asia might be to keep channels open (intelligence chiefs, military-to-military hotlines, etc.) to manage crises and seize opportunities for détente when they arise.

Conclusion

South Asia’s geopolitical landscape in 2023–2024 is a complex mosaic of rivalry and realignment. The enduring India-Pakistan tension – with its roots in partition and Kashmir – continues to cast a long shadow over regional stability. Recent developments, from skirmishes in Kashmir to diplomatic expulsions, have kept the two nuclear neighbors in a state of cold hostility, even as outright war is deterred by the specter of mutually assured destruction. This adversarial relationship has stymied regional cooperation, evident in the paralysis of SAARC and the lost opportunities for trade and connectivity. Yet, amid this impasse, Bangladesh’s evolving foreign policy illustrates a different narrative – one of pragmatism and balance. Dhaka’s “friendship to all” approach and its active engagement in both regional initiatives and global frameworks (like its Indo-Pacific Outlook) show that smaller states are not mere bystanders but can shape outcomes in their own right. Bangladesh’s success in maintaining cordial ties with India while deepening cooperation with China has not only boosted its economy but also provided a possible template for other South Asian countries seeking development without choosing sides. Looking ahead, the interplay between the India-Pakistan rivalry and the strategies of countries like Bangladesh (and others such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, and even external players) will determine whether South Asia remains mired in division or moves toward a more cooperative future. Key areas to watch include military postures – any arms race escalation or, conversely, confidence-building measures – and diplomatic engagements through multilateral forums. If India and Pakistan continue on the current trajectory, South Asia may further fragment into parallel tracks: one orbit revolving around India’s growing global partnerships and another around China’s BRI investments, with countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal navigating between them. This could heighten big-power rivalry on the subcontinent. Conversely, should there be even a limited thaw – for example, a reinvigorated SAARC trade agenda or agreements on humanitarian issues – it could unlock tremendous regional potential. The comparative lessons from ASEAN and the Middle East suggest that intractable differences can sometimes be managed or resolved through patient dialogue, economic interdependence, and third-party facilitation at the right moment. South Asia’s own history offers a glimmer of hope: the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 survived multiple wars and remains a model of cooperation. Even today, technical talks on water-sharing quietly continue, and the Kartarpur Corridor for pilgrims functions despite political estrangement. These indicate that mutually beneficial engagement is possible when insulated from grand politics. In conclusion, South Asia’s geopolitics is at a crossroads. The ongoing India-Pakistan tensions ensure that security dilemmas and mistrust persist, keeping the region on alert and limiting collective progress. Meanwhile, Bangladesh’s diplomatic balancing and rising profile exemplify shifts in regional dynamics – smaller states asserting their agency and emphasizing development and connectivity. Bridging the gap between conflict and cooperation will require visionary leadership in New Delhi and Islamabad, sustained confidence-building, and supportive nudges from regional partners like Dhaka – along with the broader international community – to reinforce peace. If South Asia can ease its internal divisions, the payoffs in terms of stability and prosperity would be immense for its two billion people. Until then, the region will continue to be shaped by the delicate dance of rivalry and rapprochement, with each nation calibrating its foreign policy to navigate an uncertain landscape.