Rokan's Journal

By Brig Gen (retd) HRM Rokan Uddin, psc

For over a decade and a half, Bangladesh’s internal political dynamics have been heavily influenced by external patronage—most notably by India. The Hasina-led Awami League government, in power for 16 consecutive years since 2009, had developed an overtly submissive foreign policy toward India. Under her leadership, a number of critical agreements were signed which disproportionately favored Indian interests, often at the expense of Bangladesh’s sovereignty, economic interests, and long-term security.

India’s support for Sheikh Hasina was not merely political—it was strategic. From trade and connectivity to security and intelligence collaboration, India reaped substantial benefits by ensuring that a pliant government remained in Dhaka. In many ways, Hasina’s administration functioned as an extension of Indian regional policy, a reality that many patriotic Bangladeshis deeply resented.

Among the major strategic concessions made during Hasina’s tenure were the agreements concerning corridor access, transit routes, unrestricted use of Bangladeshi ports, and trade terms that overwhelmingly benefited Indian exporters. The Teesta water-sharing agreement—never ratified—was long delayed, while the Ganges water-sharing pact favored Indian control of upstream flow. Despite India’s frequent breach of border protocols, including extrajudicial killings of Bangladeshi nationals by BSF, the Hasina government remained conspicuously silent.

One of the most glaring examples of Hasina’s policy of appeasement was the lease of 900 acres of prime industrial land in the Mirsarai-Sitakunda Economic Zone to India for exclusive use as an EPZ. This decision, made without public debate or parliamentary scrutiny, poses a direct threat to Bangladesh’s national security, particularly in a strategically sensitive region like Chattogram.

The sudden fall of the Hasina regime—precipitated by sustained public discontent, electoral manipulation, and youth-led uprisings—was not only a domestic political earthquake but a strategic shock to India. For New Delhi, Hasina was not just a neighborly partner; she was a dependable satellite. Her collapse exposed India’s overreach and generated panic among Indian strategic circles.

In the aftermath of Hasina’s departure, India’s posture has turned increasingly aggressive. Disinformation campaigns targeting the new leadership—particularly the respected Nobel laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus, who has openly advocated for democratic reforms and equitable regional cooperation—have intensified. Indian media and certain diplomatic circles have sought to discredit the legitimacy of the new government, portraying the popular uprising as “instability” rather than a sovereign democratic correction.

India has also begun taking hardline security actions across the border. Troop deployments have increased, especially near sensitive border points like Lalmonirhat. BSF has ramped up illegal border demarcation activities, pushing fences inside Bangladeshi territory in violation of international law. Floodlights have been installed along the border, raising both privacy and environmental concerns. Air assets have reportedly been deployed near Lalmonirhat, an act of clear intimidation and violation of neighborhood norms.

Moreover, the phenomenon of “push-in” operations—where illegal migrants or criminals are deliberately funneled into Bangladeshi territory by Indian forces—has seen a disturbing rise. Simultaneously, India has halted visa services for Bangladeshis, weaponizing mobility to exert pressure on the public psyche and diplomatic framework.

From a geostrategic standpoint, two areas must be urgently addressed to ensure Bangladesh’s national integrity: the Siliguri Corridor, widely known as the “Chicken’s Neck,” and the Feni strip near the southeastern border. If hostilities escalate, either of these regions could be used as pressure points. The Siliguri Corridor, which connects mainland India to its seven northeastern states, is extremely narrow and strategically vulnerable. Which Bangladesh can use as tram card if she is ready.  Conversely, the Feni area in southeastern Bangladesh is also susceptible—if India were to control or block that corridor, it could theoretically sever Chattogram and Cox’s Bazar from the rest of the country.

Given these multifaceted and intensifying threats, Bangladesh must move decisively and intelligently.

First, the government must immediately review and, where necessary, cancel all bilateral agreements that compromise national sovereignty, particularly those signed without public consensus or parliamentary approval. The 900-acre land lease in Mirsarai for Indian industrial use must be revoked without delay on national security grounds.

Second, there must be an urgent and robust enhancement of border security. This includes the deployment of elite forces in critical zones such as Lalmonirhat, Kurigram, Brahmanbaria, and Sylhet. Importantly, this should be complemented by integrating local populations into security planning, encouraging community-based intelligence gathering, and maintaining active civil-military coordination in vulnerable border areas.

Third, strategic infrastructure such as the Lalmonirhat Airport must be revived and modernized. It should be developed into a dual-use commercial and military airbase, serving both economic and defense purposes in the northern frontier. Similarly, the Feni corridor should be reinforced with transport and surveillance infrastructure to deter infiltration and ensure quick mobilization of defense assets. The bridge constructed during Hasina regime should be dismantled so that use is denied.

Fourth, Bangladesh must pursue a proactive and bold diplomatic strategy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must present documented evidence of India’s border violations, push-ins, and disinformation campaigns at international platforms, including the United Nations and OIC. Strategic alliances should be expanded beyond South Asia—reinvigorating ties with the Middle East, ASEAN, and other neutral or sympathetic nations to balance India’s regional dominance.

Fifth, while geography compels us to live beside India, it does not demand subservience. Bangladesh must pursue a policy of dignified coexistence, based on mutual respect, international law, and the principles of non-interference. We may not choose our neighbors, but we can certainly choose how we interact with them. Respectful relations must replace dependency. Equality must replace subjugation.

Sixth, given the strategic sensitivity of both the Siliguri and Feni corridors, it is imperative to ensure robust and sustained military presence in these areas. The establishment of permanent or forward-deployable military installations is essential—not only to guarantee territorial integrity and effective surveillance but also to enable swift and decisive action in the event of any security threat, border incursion, or geopolitical instability. In these narrow and vulnerable corridors, where any delay in response could have disproportionate consequences, the presence of armed forces serves as both a deterrent and a rapid reaction force.

Finally, the people of Bangladesh—especially the youth—must remain vigilant. National security is not the burden of the military alone; it is a collective responsibility. Civil society, media, academia, and professionals must all rise in defense of the nation’s sovereignty—not through blind nationalism, but through informed, principled, and strategic patriotism. In this volatile geopolitical landscape, Bangladesh cannot afford to be passive. It must redefine its foreign policy, restore its strategic depth, and protect its territorial integrity with firmness and foresight. Let this be a turning point—not toward confrontation, but toward a sovereign, secure, and self-respecting Bangladesh, ready to engage the world on equal footing.