Rokan's Journal

-HRM Rokan Uddin

Since their independence in 1947, India and Pakistan have been locked in a bitter rivalry, marked by wars, border disputes, and deep mistrust. Bangladesh, born in 1971 out of that rivalry, has been caught in the shadow of this hostility for decades. India’s role in supporting the Bangladesh Liberation War is undeniable, but equally undeniable is its long-term pursuit of influence and dominance over Dhaka. For more than half a century, Bangladesh has had to navigate between the politics of gratitude, the pressures of a powerful neighbor, and its own sovereign aspirations. As the country looks ahead, it must reconsider its relations with both India and Pakistan in a pragmatic, balanced manner—free from inherited narratives, external pressures, and outdated grievances.

The partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 created two wings of Pakistan—West Pakistan and East Pakistan—separated by more than a thousand miles of Indian territory. This unnatural geography soon gave rise to political, cultural, and economic disparities. Language Movement (1952) The refusal to recognize Bangla as a state language sparked resentment in East Pakistan. Economic Discrimination, East Pakistan, despite contributing the lion’s share of export earnings (mainly through jute), was systematically deprived of fair resource allocation. Political Denial, the 1970 general election gave Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League a clear majority, but the West Pakistani leadership refused to transfer power. India seized this opportunity. With the outbreak of civil war in March 1971 and the massive refugee influx into Indian territory, New Delhi intervened militarily in December 1971. The result was the emergence of independent Bangladesh—a moment of triumph for the Bengali nation, but also a strategic victory for India in permanently weakening Pakistan.

While Bangladeshis are eternally proud of their liberation, many gradually realized that India’s support came with strings attached. For the last 54 years, New Delhi has sought to dominate Dhaka’s policies, economy, and even internal politics.

Security and Border Issues, India has built fences, engaged in border killings, and often dictated terms on water-sharing agreements. Trade and Transit, While India has secured transit through Bangladesh, reciprocity has remained limited. Diplomatic Influence, For the past 16 years of Awami League rule (2009–2024), Indian influence was at its peak, often stifling Bangladesh’s ability to diversify its foreign policy. Bangladesh, however, is not willing to accept any external “bossing.” The spirit of 1971 was not just about breaking from West Pakistan, but also about standing as a truly sovereign nation—free from domination by any power, including India.

It is equally true that West Pakistan discriminated against East Pakistan, leading to resentment and eventually the freedom struggle. The war of 1971 was both a fight for self-determination and a response to systematic injustices. But history shows that no enmity is permanent. The United States and Vietnam fought a devastating war but now share strong diplomatic ties. Japan and the U.S., despite World War II and nuclear bombings, became close allies within a generation. Even India and China, despite wars and border clashes, continue to engage in trade and dialogue. If great powers can move beyond bitter wars, why should Bangladesh and Pakistan remain perpetually trapped in 1971’s shadow?

One of the major hurdles to normalizing relations with Pakistan has been India’s persistent narrative that reconciliation is impossible unless Pakistan issues a formal apology for the events of 1971. For decades, New Delhi has sought to frame the discourse on Bangladesh–Pakistan ties, emphasizing that Dhaka must not move forward without extracting an explicit acknowledgment of guilt from Islamabad. This position, however, serves India’s strategic interests more than Bangladesh’s national interest. There is no doubt that 1971 was a traumatic and defining chapter in Bangladesh’s history. Millions were displaced, atrocities were committed, and the struggle for self-determination culminated in independence. While an apology from Pakistan could serve as a symbolic gesture of reconciliation, making it the sole precondition for dialogue risks trapping Bangladesh in a static historical moment, preventing it from pursuing pragmatic diplomacy in the present.

History shows that reconciliation between former adversaries does not always rest on formal apologies. Equally important is the principle of sovereignty. Bangladesh’s diplomacy must not be dictated by external conditions, whether from India or any other power. While India may seek to leverage its role in 1971 as a perpetual reminder of Bangladesh’s “obligation,” such a mindset undermines the very foundation of Bangladesh’s independence. Dhaka’s foreign policy should be guided by its own national interest, strategic needs, and the aspirations of its people, not by the narratives or conditions of a neighboring state. Reconciliation with Pakistan, therefore, does not mean forgetting 1971. Rather, it means recognizing the lessons of the past while refusing to remain hostage to it. By engaging Islamabad on equal terms—focusing on trade, connectivity, and regional security—Bangladesh can strengthen its own sovereignty while also reducing India’s leverage over its foreign policy choices.

In essence, the Indian demand for an apology should be seen as their narrative, not ours. Bangladesh has every right to set its own terms of engagement with Pakistan—one rooted in pragmatism, balance, and the pursuit of friends, not masters.

Strengthening ties with Pakistan could serve multiple purposes:

Strategic Balance: Diversifying partnerships prevents overdependence on India or any single power.

Economic Opportunities: Pakistan, with its population of 240 million, is a large potential market for Bangladeshi goods, particularly textiles.

Muslim World Connectivity: A closer relationship with Pakistan can strengthen Bangladesh’s position in the wider Muslim world and within the OIC.

Regional Stability: Rapprochement could reduce hostility in South Asia and open doors for broader regional cooperation.

Bangladesh must pursue a balanced foreign policy, maintain working relations with India but resist subordination. Rebuild ties with Pakistan based on mutual respect, not conditionality. Strengthen bonds with China, the Muslim world, and Western partners for economic and strategic diversity. Above all, prioritize Bangladesh’s national interest, not the agendas of external powers.

Bangladesh’s birth was shaped by the rivalries of its two larger neighbors—India and Pakistan. But more than fifty years later, it is time for Dhaka to craft a path independent of both. History has shown that nations once bitter enemies can become partners if pragmatism prevails.

Bangladesh needs friends, not masters. For its survival, growth, and dignity, it must shed the old shackles of Indian dominance and embrace a balanced, multipolar diplomacy. Building new bridges with Pakistan—without preconditions dictated by India—could be an important step in that journey.