Rokan's Journal

By Brigadier General (Retd) HRM Rokan Uddin, psc

In recent years, the political landscape of South Asia has undergone a quiet but profound transformation. At the heart of this shift lies the emergence of a new strategic understanding among several South Asian nations and China, unofficially referred to by many geopolitical analysts as the South Asian China Alliance (SACA)—a regional convergence of political, economic, and security interests outside the shadow of Indian dominance.

SAARC: A Vision That Never Took Flight

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established in 1985 with the hope of fostering regional cooperation among South Asian nations—Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (and later Afghanistan). The idea was to promote peace, economic collaboration, and collective development. But from its inception, SAARC was burdened by deep political rivalries, particularly the India-Pakistan conflict, which routinely derailed progress.

India, being the largest and most economically powerful member, was expected to lead SAARC towards integration and mutual development. However, over time, many member states began to view India not as a facilitator, but as a hegemon—one that used its dominance to marginalize smaller neighbors, dictate terms, and suppress dissenting views.

Despite its founding vision, SAARC never achieved its potential due to persistent mistrust and unresolved disputes, especially between India and Pakistan. India’s overwhelming size and economic clout increasingly led smaller members to feel sidelined. Instead of fostering equality, India was often seen as imposing its will, undermining the spirit of genuine regional cooperation.

Indian Hegemony and Stubbornness: The Root Cause of Disillusionment

Across South Asia, a growing perception emerged that India’s regional ambitions were less about cooperation and more about control. This manifested in several ways:

Obstruction of SAARC Summits – Repeated cancellations of SAARC summits due to India’s refusal to engage with Pakistan crippled the organization.

Unilateral Actions – From revoking Kashmir’s special status in 2019 without regional consultation, to imposing trade blockades (such as the 2015 blockade on Nepal), India often acted without considering the views of its neighbors.

Diplomatic Arrogance – Smaller nations such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh often complained—sometimes publicly—about being treated as satellite states or junior partners rather than sovereign equals. Security Overreach – India’s constant suspicion of Chinese influence in its neighborhood led it to interfere in internal affairs of neighboring countries under the pretext of “regional stability.”

This hegemonic and often dismissive approach alienated many member states, eroding the spirit of SAARC. India’s assertive regional posture, often cloaked in the language of security and stability, fostered deep resentment among its neighbors. Its reluctance to engage multilaterally, preference for dominance over dialogue, and disregard for smaller nations’ sovereignty created a trust deficit. This persistent behavior ultimately fragmented SAARC’s foundation and stifled its growth potential.

The Rise of SACA: A Strategic Realignment

In this vacuum, China emerged as an alternative power—economically attractive, politically pragmatic, and strategically assertive. Many South Asian nations began deepening bilateral ties with China, resulting in an informal but growing regional axis that increasingly excludes India. This realignment now manifests in:

Massive Chinese Investments: Under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China invested billions in Bangladesh (Padma Bridge, Payra Port), Sri Lanka (Hambantota Port, Colombo Port City), Nepal (infrastructure and hydropower), Pakistan (CPEC), and Maldives (airport and housing projects).

Military Cooperation: China has become a key arms supplier and defense partner for Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, providing training, equipment, and even joint production capabilities.

Diplomatic Support: China often backs smaller South Asian countries in international forums when India exerts pressure—enhancing its image as a reliable partner.

Mutual Grievance Against Indian Arrogance: What unites many of these countries is a shared sense of frustration with India’s inflexibility. The China connection is not merely opportunistic—it’s increasingly ideological, a choice to escape Indian hegemony.

Thus, SACA is not a formal organization like SAARC, but it is an emerging geopolitical reality: a new balancing force countering India’s long-standing regional monopoly.

The Death of SAARC

SAARC is now largely defunct: No full summit has been held since 2014. Member states focus on bilateral or multilateral arrangements excluding India. India itself is pushing alternatives like BIMSTEC, which conveniently excludes Pakistan. But even BIMSTEC has failed to gain traction, as countries question India’s sincerity in regional integration, given its tendency to monopolize both narrative and negotiation. With SAARC moribund, its secretariat in Kathmandu drifts, issuing communiqués while political leaders avoid the summit table. Afghanistan’s suspension after the Taliban takeover further reduces quorum. Nepal and Sri Lanka increasingly court China’s BRI forums; Bangladesh and Bhutan sign selective trilateral accords with Japan or ASEAN. Meanwhile Delhi touts BIMSTEC and the Indo-Pacific narrative, yet its opaque agenda and security-centric rhetoric discourage genuine pooling of resources or institutional deepening.

Public Opinion: From Disappointment to Defiance

In South Asia, especially in Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and increasingly in Bangladesh and Maldives, public opinion is shifting:

India’s image across South Asia has undergone a significant transformation. Once seen as a potential anchor of stability and shared prosperity, India is now increasingly perceived as an overbearing power that seeks to dictate terms rather than foster equitable partnerships. Its frequent diplomatic high-handedness, border disputes, and attempts to influence domestic politics in neighboring countries have deepened suspicions.

In Nepal, India’s imposition of an unofficial blockade in 2015—after Nepal promulgated its new constitution without India’s approval—sparked widespread anti-India protests and led to a surge of nationalism. Similarly, in Bangladesh, India’s perceived indifference to core bilateral issues such as equitable water sharing, the killing of civilians along the border by BSF, and trade imbalances have eroded trust among the public.

China’s growing role in regional infrastructure, trade, and diplomacy is now being welcomed by many as a strategic counterbalance to India’s dominance. For several civil society leaders and regional scholars, China offers an alternative development model—one that is pragmatic and free from the political conditions India often attaches.

Meanwhile, the rise of nationalism and identity-based politics in countries like Nepal, Bangladesh, and even the Maldives is reinforcing the call for sovereign decision-making free from Indian pressure. These sentiments are particularly strong among youth, intellectuals, and political groups seeking to reassert cultural, economic, and diplomatic autonomy.

The cumulative effect is clear: India’s traditional influence is weakening, and a new regional psychology is taking hold—one that is more multipolar, assertive, and resistant to unilateral dominance.

 A New Regional Order

The death of SAARC and the birth of SACA mark a profound geopolitical transition in South Asia. While India remains a dominant power in size and capacity, its failure to exercise responsible regional leadership, coupled with its inflexible diplomacy and hegemonic instincts, has cost it the trust of its neighbors.

As a result, a new, China-oriented South Asian bloc is taking shape, driven not by ideology alone but by strategic pragmatism, economic opportunity, and a collective desire to escape the gravitational pull of Indian hegemony.