Rokan's Journal

Brig Gen HRM Rokan Uddin (Retd)

Bangladesh’s experience with elections has never unfolded in isolation. From the very birth of the state, external forces—regional powers, global actors, donors, and international institutions—have interacted with domestic politics in ways that shaped not only election stability but also the deeper character of governance. These influences have rarely operated in a direct or mechanical manner; instead, they have altered incentives, legitimate calculations, and power balances inside the country, often amplifying existing internal tensions.

The first and most formative example lies in the events surrounding 1971. The liberation of Bangladesh was inseparable from the geopolitical environment of South Asia and the Cold War. India’s decisive military intervention, driven by security concerns and a massive refugee influx, ensured the defeat of Pakistan and the emergence of an independent Bangladesh. While independence created the possibility of popular sovereignty, it also embedded a security-centric mindset into the new state. Early governance was shaped by the realities of regional dependence, post-war reconstruction, and the need for international recognition. Elections in the 1970s were therefore conducted in a context where survival of the state and consolidation of authority took precedence over institutionalized competition. This legacy of prioritizing stability and security over pluralism would resurface repeatedly in later decades.

During the late 1970s and 1980s, the role of external economic actors became more pronounced. Under military rule, particularly during the Ershad period, Bangladesh was heavily dependent on foreign aid and concessional lending. International donors and financial institutions increasingly link economic assistance to governance standards, fiscal discipline, and political accountability. By the late 1980s, as popular resistance to authoritarian rule intensified, donor pressure narrowed the regime’s room for maneuvering. Although the mass uprising that toppled Ershad in 1990 was fundamentally domestic, external economic leverage contributed to elite fragmentation and reduced the regime’s ability to sustain itself. The subsequent restoration of parliamentary democracy reinforced the idea that electoral legitimacy, recognized both at home and abroad, was essential for stable governance.

The 1990s demonstrated perhaps the clearest example of how external expectations interacted with domestic mistrust to shape electoral arrangements. Deep polarization between major parties, combined with memories of manipulated polls, created a crisis of confidence in election administration. The introduction of a neutral caretaker government system was not simply a local innovation; it was also influenced by the awareness that elections lacking credibility would face international skepticism, reduced aid confidence, and diplomatic isolation. When elections were held under the caretaker framework, they were broadly accepted domestically and internationally, and this acceptance translated into relative political stability. Over time, however, reliance on this externally validated neutrality created a structural vulnerability: once the system was removed, mistrust returned with greater intensity.

The crisis of 2006–2008 further illustrated how international legitimacy could act as a constraint. Amid violent street politics and a contested electoral roadmap, international actors such as the European Union and the United Nations withdrew or suspended election observation, signaling that any deeply flawed poll would lack recognition. At the same time, Bangladesh’s extensive participation in UN peacekeeping missions created a strong incentive for the military establishment to avoid international disrepute. The result was the emergence of a military-backed interim administration that postponed elections, restructured the voter list, and organized a poll in 2008 that was widely accepted. This episode reinforced a powerful lesson for political elites: external acceptance could decisively influence the timing and form of elections, even if it did not determine outcomes directly.

After 2014, the relationship between external pressure and election stability became more adversarial. The boycotted election that year drew strong criticism from Western governments and international human-rights organizations. Rather than compelling compromise, however, external criticism hardened positions. The government framed international pressure as interference in sovereignty, while the opposition used it to delegitimize the ruling process. This dynamic contributed to a governance model increasingly focused on control, continuity, and regime security, with elections treated more as formal exercises than competitive contests. International pressure, in this context, became another element in domestic political struggle rather than a stabilizing force.

In the years leading up to and following the 2018 election, targeted measures such as public statements, sanctions-related warnings, and visa restrictions from Western states sought to influence behavior around electoral violence and manipulation. At the same time, Bangladesh’s leadership balanced these pressures by cultivating alternative diplomatic and economic relationships. Regional dynamics, particularly the strategic interests of India and China, provided room for maneuver. India’s long-standing political support for Sheikh Hasina was widely perceived as prioritizing regional stability and security cooperation, while China emphasized non-interference and development partnership. The availability of such geopolitical counterweights diluted the impact of Western pressure and reduced the likelihood that external actors alone could restore electoral competitiveness.

Across all these episodes, a consistent pattern emerges. External forces have rarely decided who wins elections in Bangladesh, but they have strongly influenced how elections are conducted, whether they are perceived as legitimate, and how political actors calculate risks. International recognition, economic incentives, reputational costs, and geopolitical alignments have repeatedly shaped the “stability bargain” between ruling elites, opposition forces, and state institutions. When external expectations aligned with a domestic consensus—as during the caretaker-era elections—governance benefited from greater legitimacy and relative calm. When external pressures collided with intense polarization and entrenched patronage networks, they often deepened mistrust and pushed governance toward greater centralization and coercion. In this sense, the history of elections in Bangladesh shows that external influence is most powerful not when it dictates outcomes, but when it subtly reshapes the incentives under which domestic actors choose between compromise, confrontation, and control.

Bangladesh’s upcoming 2026 national election, scheduled for 12 February 2026, carries exceptionally high public expectations shaped by the tumultuous political events of recent years, widespread calls for democratic renewal, and people’s deep desire for stability, fairness, and improved governance. Many ordinary citizens are urging that this election be 100 % free, fair, and genuinely reflective of the popular will, seeing it as a crucial opportunity to revitalize the democratic process and restore trust in politics after years of polarization and institutional distrust. Voters hope a credible election will help rebuild faith in state institutions, reduce political violence, and lead to a government capable of addressing everyday challenges such as economic insecurity, unemployment, rising living costs, and public safety concerns. There is also hope for meaningful reforms that empower women, protect minority rights, and enhance social justice and rule of law—issues that resonate strongly in voters’ minds. Many Bangladeshis see these elections not just as a vote for political parties, but as a referendum on democratic legitimacy, inclusive governance, and national confidence moving forward.

hrmrokan@hotmail.com