Rokan's Journal

Maj Gen HRM Rokan Uddin (Retd)

There is a meaningful distinction between weathering a political movement and facing a death sentence, and this distinction sits at the heart of why Sheikh Hasina is unlikely to set foot in Bangladesh again. In the 1990s, and even during the army-backed caretaker period of 2007-08, she confronted political cases, corruption charges, the risk of imprisonment or exile – all of which carry room for negotiation, pardon, foreign mediation, or a shift in the political wind. A death sentence carries no such room. The International Crimes Tribunal-1 has already sentenced her to death for crimes against humanity, in a verdict delivered in November 2025 and published in full – 457 pages – in January 2026. This is no longer speculation or political accusation; it is a judicial fact on record. Any calculation about her return must start from that reality.

The comparison with her 2024 flight is instructive. That time, she escaped the immediate eruption of public fury – there was no institutional verdict against her, only a spontaneous uprising. Today the situation is worse on two fronts at once: a death sentence has been finalized through the legal process, and the public anger that toppled her in 2024 has had a year and a half to compound, sharpened further by the demand for justice from the families of those killed in the July uprising. Returning now would mean facing both a legal execution and the very real possibility of mob violence – two separate and equally lethal risks stacked on top of each other.

The government’s own position is caught in a genuine bind. It is easy for the interim government and for political forces like the NCP, whose legitimacy rests on the July movement, to declare publicly that “the verdict must be enforced by bringing her back.” But managing the actual logistics of her return, securing her, maintaining order through the trial and its aftermath, and containing the risk of unrest is an administrative burden of an entirely different order. Despite an extradition treaty with India, Delhi has not in practice handed her over, and that hesitation itself reveals how much more complicated the reality is that the public rhetoric suggests.

The question of law-and-order capacity is a structural weakness worth taking seriously. Since the 2024 transition, the police force’s morale, organizational capacity, and public trust have all been severely damaged. If her return triggers a large gathering or a violent reaction, the police alone will struggle to contain it. And using the army, the Border Guard, or RAB against the public is politically explosive – one of the central messages of the 2024 movement was precisely that the army should not be turned against the people, and it was the army’s decision to stand with the public that made the transfer of power possible in the first place. Breaking that precedent to deploy forces against the public again would be self-destructive for any government.

On the BDR massacre, clarification is necessary. Her direct involvement in the 2009 BDR mutiny remains a subject of intense public suspicion, debate, and conflicting investigative findings, but calling it “100 percent proven” overstates the judicial record – no final criminal verdict has been reached in that specific case, even though she has now been sentenced to death in the July uprising case. The more defensible framing is this: many analysts, military officers, and victims’ families have raised serious and persistent questions about her role in the BDR killings, and if that case were reopened or reinvestigated, it would represent an additional legal exposure layered on top of a death sentence already awaiting execution. Facing one capital sentence is deterrent enough; the prospect of a second highly sensitive case only reduces her incentive to return further.

The sixth point is perhaps the most important. It is true that after the uprising, Awami League leaders’ homes and businesses were attacked but there was no large-scale loss of life – a sign, arguably, of restraint on the part of the public. But the concern that her return could unleash a new wave of public fury, one that spills over onto Awami League leaders still in custody, is not unreasonable. The memory of the 1975 jail killings remains a deep wound in Bangladesh’s political culture, and the fear that history could repeat itself in a moment of extreme political tension is not baseless. Seen this way, her continued absence is arguably in the practical interest of the Awami League’s remaining leadership role- her presence could become the very catalyst that brings about a far worse outcome for the party.

Finally, the question of why she would return at all has its own grounded answer. Nearly two decades in power left substantial wealth accumulated, business interests tied to family and close associates, and long-term refuge available in a powerful neighboring state – taken together, there is no material or personal necessity to come back. Some political leaders, late in life, are drawn to the symbolic weight of martyrdom, but her past conducted especially the swift decision to flee in 2024 – suggests she has consistently prioritized self-preservation over ideological sacrifice.

That said, a complete picture requires acknowledging the counterarguments. Some observers argue that India’s bilateral and strategic considerations may not permit indefinite shelter, and that mounting international pressure could eventually force extradition. Others point out that political reversals are not unusual in Bangladesh, and that a future government more sympathetic to the Awami League could in theory reopen the door to a negotiated settlement or clemency. Still others suggest that Hasina or her supporters might deliberately construct a long-term political narrative around her as a “symbolic martyr” though most observers consider this the least likely scenario. None of these counterpoints overturn the central conclusion, but they round out the analysis. This is another game India is playing with Hasina to put pressure on the Bangladesh Government. But India must not disregard the international norms as far as not following the agreement of handover of criminals sheltered in their soil.

However, India, as the world’s largest democracy and a country that has consistently emphasized the importance of the rule of law and international cooperation, should also uphold its international legal and treaty obligations. One important aspect of this responsibility relates to the handling of individuals who are wanted by the competent authorities of neighboring countries for serious criminal offences. Where bilateral extradition or mutual legal assistance agreements exist, or where requests are made in accordance with international law, such requests should be considered fairly, objectively, and in good faith. Providing safe haven, whether intentionally or through inaction, to individuals accused of terrorism, organized crime, corruption, violent offences, or other serious crimes can undermine mutual trust and create unnecessary friction in bilateral relations.

Bangladesh and India share one of the longest international borders in the world, extensive economic ties, deep historical links, and close security cooperation. Over the past two decades, both countries have collaborated in addressing cross-border terrorism, insurgency, human trafficking, narcotics smuggling, and other transnational crimes. This cooperation has significantly contributed to regional stability and demonstrated that mutual security is best achieved through reciprocity, trust, and adherence to agreed legal frameworks.

The same principle should apply consistently in all circumstances. If individuals accused of serious criminal offences take shelter across the border, both countries should process extradition or legal assistance requests in accordance with their domestic laws, bilateral agreements, and internationally accepted legal standards. Political considerations should not override legal obligations, nor should criminal allegations be ignored simply because the accused has crossed into another jurisdiction. At the same time, every extradition request should be examined carefully to ensure that sufficient legal evidence is presented, and that internationally recognized principles of due process, fair trial, and human rights are respected.

Respect for extradition arrangements is not merely a legal obligation; it is also a confidence-building measure between neighboring states. Failure to address such matters transparently may encourage criminals to exploit international borders as safe havens, weaken public confidence in bilateral cooperation, and provide opportunities for transnational criminal networks to expand their operations. Neither Bangladesh nor India benefits when fugitives can evade justice by taking refuge across the border.

As responsible neighbors with shared security interests, both Bangladesh and India should continue to strengthen judicial cooperation, intelligence sharing, border management, and law enforcement coordination. A relationship founded on mutual respect, reciprocity, and faithful implementation of bilateral agreements is essential for long-term regional peace and stability. Ensuring that individuals accused of serious crimes are dealt with in accordance with the law—rather than being allowed to exploit political or jurisdictional differences—would reinforce the credibility of both countries’ justice systems and further strengthen the foundation of bilateral relations.